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Abstract 
South Africa is a water-scarce country with an average rainfall of 500 mm per year. It is esti-
mated that national water demand will exceed supply by 2025. Increasing the water supply would 
be environmentally, financially or politically unfeasible. Impoverished communities, especially 
those in rural areas, require access to water for drinking, cooking and other basic purposes (such 
as agriculture). Only approximately 24 per cent of rural people have access to water on site. Un-
employment in the rural areas of South Africa is estimated at about 34 per cent. This study seeks 
to explore ways of reducing poverty in South Africa while implementing policies that address 
water scarcity problems. 
The South African Government is exploring ways to address water scarcity problems by intro-
ducing a water resource management charge. This will be based on the quantity of water used, 
and applied to sectors such as irrigated agriculture, mining and forestry. This is expected to 
achieve both a more efficient allocation and lower use of water, as well as helping to alleviate 
poverty. This paper reports on the validity of these options, providing more information for the 
policy-making process. This study applies a computable general-equilibrium model to analyse 
the double dividend of water consumption charges in South Africa. The first dividend is envi-
ronmental: more water will be available as a result of an additional water charge;  the second 
dividend is developmental: revenue generated from these charges will be recycled back into pov-
erty alleviation programmes.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper1 analyses a proposal by the South African Government to reduce water con-
sumption by introducing a water resource management charge2. The Water Resource 
Management Charges are implemented to recover the cost of water resource manage-
ment in each water management area (WMA) in South Africa. It differs from Pigouvian 
tax, which is a tax on an external cost, such as pollution, designed to use market forces to 
achieve an efficient allocation of resources. Pigouvian tax attempts to reach optimal wel-
fare; charge is a mark-up cost and has little relation to reaching optimal welfare. The 
costs of these additional water charges to the South African economy are estimated with 
a particular emphasis on poverty reduction. The benefits of recycling the water charges 
revenue into schemes to raise the income of the poor are also evaluated3. 
The literature on the use and availability of water, socio-economic indicators and water 
policies in South Africa is reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 focuses on the concept of a 
double dividend and its application to environmental taxation. The model and data used 
in this paper, including the simulation results, are presented in Section 4 and discussed in 
Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Water scarcity and poverty in South Africa 
South Africa is classified as a semi-arid country. Precipitation has fluctuated over the 
years (see Figure 1) with an average of 500 m3 per annum, well below the world average 
of about 860 mm per year (DWAF 2002). The total flow of all the rivers in the country 
amounts to approximately 49,200 million m³ per year. The National Water Resource 
Strategy estimates total water requirements for the year 2000 at 13,280 million m3, ex-
cluding environmental requirements. In addition, South Africa is poorly endowed with 
groundwater because most of the country lies on hard rock formations that do not con-
tain any major groundwater aquifers (DWAF 2002).  
                                                   
1  Paper presented at 2nd International Conference on Environmental Concerns: Innovative 
Technologies and Management Options, October 12-15, Xiamen, China. 
2  This is not pigouvian tax, but a proposal by the Government to reduce water consumption, 
see Pigou (1920).  
3  The recycling of revenue options are designed to alleviate poverty and not to address inequal-
ity.  
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Figure 1 Precipitation in South Africa (1922-1999). 
Source: CSIR (2001). 
Figure 2 describes water requirements by sector in South Africa. The agricultural sector 
is the largest consumer of water, at 59 per cent. It is primarily large-scale farmers that 
use 95 per cent of irrigation water; small-scale farmers use the remainder (Schreiner and 
van Koppen 2002). Afforestation requires 4 per cent of the total water requirements and 
rural and urban populations require 4 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively. Mining and 
bulk industrial purposes, and power generation use 6 per cent and 2 per cent, respec-
tively.  
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Figure 2 Water requirements by sector in South Africa: 2000. 
Source: DWAF (2002) 
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Nevertheless, water resources are essential to transform society, with the goal of greater 
social and environmental justice and poverty eradication (Schreiner and van Koppen 
2002). Rural people require water for drinking, washing, cooking and for productive 
purposes such as farming, livestock, forestry, fisheries and small-scale industries that 
deal with income poverty. Almost 50 per cent of the population is ‘income-poor’, spend-
ing less than R353 per adult equivalent per month. About 70 per cent of these poor peo-
ple live in rural areas (Schreiner and van Koppen 2002). 
Table 1 highlights a number of selected socio-economic indicators in South Africa in 
2001. About 23 per cent and 32 per cent of the rural population depend on remittances 
and pensions, and grants, respectively. In addition, only approximately 24 per cent of ru-
ral people have access to piped water on site and only 15 per cent have access to sanita-
tion. The additional charge on water used by economic sectors might lead to both a more 
effective allocation and a lower use of water resources, and possibly a positive impact on 
poverty alleviation. This would translate into more water being available for drinking, 
washing and productive activities, which might increase the income of the poor and re-
duce the number of people affected by poverty. However, this study only addresses pov-
erty reduction options and not necessarily inequality. 
Table 1 Selected socio-economic indicators: 2001. 
 National Rural 
Unemployment rate (%):   
- Official (restricted) definition 26.4 33.9 
- Unofficial (expanded) definition 37.0 52.2 
Portion of household (%):   
- With piped water in the dwelling or on site 65.7 24.3 
- Using mainly wood for cooking 19.6 53.8 
- Using mainly electricity for cooking 52.5 18.3 
- Using mainly paraffin for cooking 21.1 19.2 
- With access to hygienic sanitation 62.2 18.0 
- Where refuse / rubbish is removed by a local authority 54.8 15.5 
- With access to telephone 33.7 22.3 
- Within 14 minutes of nearest clinic 36.3 20.8 
- Within 14 minutes of nearest primary school 54.3 41.7 
- Within 14 minutes of nearest food market 50.9 40.1 
- Dependent on remittances  13.8 23.5 
- Dependent on pensions and grants  17.8 32.2 
- With a radio 79.1 72.2 
- With a TV 56.4 35.0 
Source: Statistics South Africa (2002). 
The above discussion demonstrates the scarcity of water in South Africa, as well as the 
prevalence of poverty. The next question regards how water resources are managed. To 
that effect, a consensus was reached at the Dublin Conference on Water and the Envi-
ronment that water should be regarded as an economic good (Briscoe 1996, Savenije and 
van der Zaag 2001, Perry et al. 1997). There are two schools of thought on the interpre-
tation of water having an economic value (Savenije and van der Zaag 2001, Perry et al. 
1997). The first school maintains that water should be priced at its economic value (as 
with other private goods, subject to allocation through competitive market pricing). In 
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other words, water should be allocated to its best uses. The second school maintains that 
water as an economic good should be exempt from competitive market pricing and 
treated as a basic human need, which does not necessarily involve financial transactions. 
This paper adopts the position that water should be priced at its economic value, while 
still ensuring that poor people have access to water resources. The value of water can be 
defined as ‘the maximum amount water users are willing to pay for the use of this re-
source, such that marginal cost and marginal benefit are equal’ (Briscoe 1996 and Perry 
et al, 2001).  
In South Africa, according to the National Water Act (Act No 36 of 1998), the Govern-
ment is regarded as the public trustee of the nation's water resources and “must ensure 
that water is protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled in a sustain-
able and equitable manner, for the benefit of all persons” (MacKay 2003). Under previ-
ous legislation in South Africa, the pricing of water did not generally take into account i) 
the real cost of managing water, ii) the cost of water supply and iii) the scarcity value of 
water (MacKay 2003:64). The capital costs of government water schemes supplying 
mainly agricultural water users (and some urban bulk water suppliers and industrial us-
ers) were financed by the Government. In addition, operation and maintenance costs 
were often not fully recovered from these water users (MacKay 2003:64-65). 
The principle behind current water pricing policies in South Africa is that payment for 
water should be at a level that reflects its scarcity, except for water required to meet ba-
sic human needs. Currently 25 litres of water per day per person is assumed to meet 
these needs. The current pricing policy is structured into three tiers (CSIR 2001): 
• First tier: raw water tariffs administered by DWAF for the sale of water to the Water 
Boards; 
• Second tier: Water Boards set the wholesale price of water to bulk water users like 
municipalities and industries (such as Eskom, Sasol); 
• Third tier: municipalities determine the price of water for end-users like households 
and industries.  
A rise in raw water tariffs will automatically lead to an increase in price within the sec-
ond and third tiers. According to the Water Act, all water users should be registered and 
pay for water. Water use is classified into three kinds: 1) schedule 1 authorisation, which 
grants lawful access for reasonable domestic use, small gardening and livestock watering 
without paying water tariffs or charges; 2) general authorisation, under which water use 
is authorised for a group of water users, as long as certain minimum requirements are 
met; and 3) water use licence, under which individual water users apply to DWAF for a 
licence to use water. In this case, water should preferably be allocated to those users 
generating the highest social, economic or environmental value and promote equity. 
Water pricing can be based on a number of strategies that include full supply cost, full 
economic cost and full cost of water (Figure 3). The South African Government is intro-
ducing a water resource management charge to recover some of the costs for water man-
agement and to reflect water scarcity in the country. This means that the Government is 
moving towards the ‘full economic costs of water’ pricing strategy by taking into ac-
count the supply cost and opportunity cost of water. 
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Figure 3: Underlying principles for the cost and value of water. 
Source: King (2004), adapted from Rogers, de Silva and Bhatia (2001). 
3. Double dividend 
According to the double dividend theory, the revenues of environmental taxes can be 
used to lower other (distortionary) taxes, and therefore lower the (economic) cost of the 
environmental tax. The positive effects of lowering other taxes could even outweigh the 
negative effects of a rise in environmental taxes. This produces a so-called ‘double divi-
dend’: both the environment (first dividend) and the economy (second dividend) will be 
in better shape than before the environmental tax reform. This would, of course, be wel-
comed by policy-makers who want to use environmental taxes to curb pollution, but find 
it hard to sell a drop in GDP or employment. It also explains why the double dividend 
theory has become a popular research theme. 
In the early phases of the double dividend theory bold statements were made about the 
general validity or invalidity of the theory. These statements were based either on partial 
models of the economy or simple one-factor GE models that assumed competitive mar-
kets (see e.g. Pearce (1991) and Bovenberg and De Mooij (1994)). Subsequent analysis 
focused on multiple production factor models and allowed for a distorted labour market. 
This analysis led to more nuanced statements about the possibility of a double dividend 
and will be discussed in the next two sections. 
3.1 Multiple production factors 
Proponents of the one-factor models claim it is impossible to attain a double dividend 
because the environmental tax would be more distortionary (in a purely economic sense) 
than the factor tax it tries to address (Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994; Goulder et al., 
1997). Adding another production factor (usually capital; one-factor models typically use 
just labour) to the modelled economy introduces the possibility of inefficiencies in the 
tax system. From a tax-efficiency point of view, taxes on the two production factors 
should have the same marginal efficiency costs or marginal excess burden (MEB), that 
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is, the loss of overall production efficiency due to taxation4. If the MEBs are not equal, 
reducing this difference diminishes the distortions in the economy caused by taxation. 
In the double dividend literature this inefficiency is "used" to create possible economic 
gains from the introduction of an environmental tax. This happens if the environmental 
tax shifts the tax burden from the over-taxed factor (with the higher MEB) to the under-
taxed factor (with the lower MEB). As stated by Goulder (1994), the gain is larger if (i) 
the difference in MEBs is larger; (ii) the burden of the environmental tax falls mainly on 
the under-taxed factor; and (iii) the recycling of revenues mainly reduces the burden of 
the over-taxed factor.  
Substitution elasticities between labour, capital and energy (the polluting input) are also 
important. When fixed, capital should be a poor substitute for energy, while labour 
should be a good substitute for energy. With an elastic capital supply, the reverse is true 
(De Mooij and Bovenberg, 1998). 
This efficiency gain has to be large enough to overcome the negative effects inherent in 
an environmental tax (its narrowness, and the extra distortionary costs that arise from 
taxing inputs or goods instead of taxing production factors directly)5. 
The effects of tax shifting have also been studied with empirical GE models. Goulder 
(1995), Bovenberg and Goulder (1997) and Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) all studied 
the results of a revenue neutral environmental tax reform for the United States with an 
intertemporal numerical GE analysis. Goulder (1995), and Bovenberg and Goulder 
(1997) failed to find a double dividend. In all their scenarios the environmental tax was 
more distortionary than the taxes it replaces and the economic costs of the tax reform are 
therefore always positive. The main reason for this is the relative narrowness of the envi-
ronmental tax. Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) did find a double dividend under certain 
conditions. Irrespective of the end result, the costs or benefits of the tax reform varied 
with the scenario chosen, and they changed in line with Goulders' (1994) expectations: 
the lower the costs, the larger the difference in MEB, and the more the tax burden was 
shifted from the over-taxed to the under-taxed factor.  
3.2 Non-competitive markets: involuntary unemployment 
The second main improvement in double dividend analysis was the inclusion of involun-
tary unemployment. In the literature, involuntary unemployment has been incorporated 
in the GE analysis in several different ways, but usually some model of wage-bargaining 
                                                   
4  The MEB of a labour tax depends on its level and on the (compensated) wage elasticity of la-
bour supply: the larger this elasticity, the greater the distortion. For a capital tax in a closed 
economy it is again the level and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption: 
the larger the elasticity, the larger the distortion along the intertemporal dimension (the mar-
gin of choice between consuming today and consuming in future). 
5  The broader the tax base the lower the distortion. Environmental taxes, however, are rela-
tively narrow by nature and on purpose because they are meant to change specific behaviour 
(Goulder, 1994). In the theoretical tax literature, taxes on intermediate inputs generally have 
larger welfare costs than do equal-revenue taxes on primary factors because they distort both 
the intermediate input choice and factor markets, instead of just distorting factor markets 
(Goulder, 1995: 288). 
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between firms and workers is used. Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998), for instance, 
use a search model of the labour market with individual worker-firm bargaining. In an-
other paper, Strand (1998) assumes a monopoly union that unilaterally determines the 
wage, after which a fixed number of firms determine employment. In Koskela, Schöb 
and Sinn (1998) a monopolistic firm determines employment, this time after bargaining 
over wages with a small trade union. 
In these papers, the double dividend depends on the effect the green tax reform has on 
the bargaining positions of firms and workers. For employment (not necessarily welfare) 
to increase, producer wages have to decrease. This happens if workers' bargaining posi-
tion deteriorates or that of the firm(s) improve. This is the case if workers' outside option 
(e.g. income under unemployment or in the informal sector) worsens or if the firm's la-
bour demand becomes more elastic with respect to wages. Another way to reduce wages 
is to shift the tax burden to the unemployed, as in the paper by Bovenberg and van der 
Ploeg (1998). 
3.3 Distributional effects 
Besides raising revenue, the most important function of taxation, is the (re)distribution of 
income between members of society. This distribution is also the main reason why tax 
systems deviate from optimality (in the absence of externalities it would be optimal to 
have a lump sum tax). Unfortunately, the way an environmental tax reform affects distri-
bution has not been studied in much detail in the double dividend literature. The scarce 
information we do have points to a small negative distributional effect, but this, of 
course, depends on the specific form of the tax return (see for example Ekins and Barker 
(2001) and Bach et al. (2002))6.  
Shifting the tax burden to the unemployed or those working in the informal sector, (as is 
done by Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998)) in order to increase employment  will ob-
viously have negative income effects on the lowest income groups. 
In conclusion, a double dividend seems possible but is by no means certain or automatic. 
Existing taxes and distortions in the labour market, together with the specific form of the 
tax reform, will determine the ultimate outcome.  
4. Model and data 
The model used here is similar to the general equilibrium ORANI-G-model of the Aus-
tralian economy (Harrison and Pearson 1996). It is a static model with an overall Leon-
tief production structure, and CES sub-structures for (i) the choice between labour, capi-
tal and land, (ii) the choice between the different labour types in the model, and (iii) the 
choice between imported and domestic inputs into the production process. Household 
demand is modelled as a linear expenditure system that differentiates between necessities 
and luxury goods, while households’ choice between imported and domestic goods is 
modelled using the CES structure. 
                                                   
6  However, this would again diminish the increased efficiency of the tax system and could, de-
pending on the measures taken, prevent a double dividend.  
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The model is based on the official 1998 social accounting matrix (SAM) of South Africa, 
published by StatsSA (SSA 2001). This SAM divides households into 12 income and 4 
ethnic groups, and distinguishes 27 sectors. For the purpose of this study, the energy and 
water intensive sectors are further split into 39 sectors. The elasticities used for the CES 
functions in the model have been taken from De Wet (2003). The model’s closure rules 
reflect a short-run time horizon. The capital stock is assumed to be fixed, while the rate 
of return on capital is allowed to change. Labour supply is modelled in the typical 
ORANI way, by assuming fixed real wages in the short run, implying perfectly elastic 
labour supply. The supply of land is also assumed to be inelastic. 
With reference to macroeconomic variables, it is assumed that aggregate investment, 
government consumption and inventories are exogenous, while consumption and the 
trade balance are endogenous. This specification gives us an insight into the effect of the 
suggested policies on South Africa’s consumption and competitiveness. All technologi-
cal change variables and all tax rates are exogenous to the model. Finally, the nominal 
exchange rate is set to be the numeraire in each of the simulations. 
4.1 Model 
The water supply and use accounts of the CSIR (2001) were used to create a vector of 
“Taxable water” for each industry in the SAM, as well as a vector of “Extra water 
charges” that may be paid according to volumes of water used. The former is a vector of 
water volumes which includes all taxable water (namely, water extracted from under-
ground or rivers, or water received from the formal water sector). In addition to the stan-
dard model, variables are also defined for taxable water used, and extra water charges, so 
as to calculate changes in total revenue raised, and changes in water demand. 
The core water equation added to the UPGEM model is as follows:  ‘Revenue raised is 
equal to the tax rate per volume times the volume of water (X)’ or: 
 R = T.X  (1)
UPGEM operates in percentage or absolute change form, and not in absolute levels. 
From equation (1) stated above, the change in revenue (dR) is approximately equal to the 
tax rate (T) times the change in the base (dX) plus the base (X) times the change in the 
rate (dT):  
 dR = T.dX + X.dT       
=T.X.x/100+X.dT 
(2a)
=R.x/100+X.dT       (2b)
This is with x the percentage change in X7. Equation (2b) is used in the model to calcu-
late the absolute changes in revenue caused by charges on water consumption for all in-
dustries. The changes in the tax rates are exogenous, and shocked according to various 
scenarios outlined below. All the other variables are entered into, or calculated by, the 
model. Note that variable x is the percentage change in water consumption by industries, 
                                                   
7  If x is the percentage change in X, then we know x = 100*dX/X, so that dX = x.X/100. 
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and it is an endogenous variable, that is, calculated by the model. We expect that an ad-
ditional charge on water will lead to a decrease in water consumption. Total revenue 
from the extra water charges are added to total government revenue. 
4.2 Water scenarios  
As mentioned in Section 2, this study has adopted the ‘full economic value of all the wa-
ter’ pricing strategy. The following scenarios were run by the UPGEM model to try and 
adhere to the suggestions proposed by water authorities and experts: 
1. A surcharge of 10c per m3 water used by forestry, irrigated agriculture & all min-
ing industries; 
On the recycling side two simulations were performed: 
2. A decrease of 0.0007 in the overall level of direct taxation on capital and labour; 
and 
3. A decrease in the overall level of sales tax on final consumption. 
No unambiguous improvement in consumption levels of any race groups in the poorest 
three household groups was found in any one of the scenarios. We therefore had to refine 
the scenarios further. Instead of placing a surcharge on all irrigated agriculture, irrigated 
agriculture was split into ‘field crops’ and ‘horticulture’, and the results reported sepa-
rately. The irrigated agriculture in the SAM was split using input-output tables supplied 
by Connningarth Consultants Consulting Economists for 1996 for South Africa. Mining 
was also split into three components – ‘gold’, ‘coal’, and ‘other mining’ – and results are 
reported separately as well. 
4.3 Simulation results 
Environmental effects 
The first of a ‘double’ or ‘triple dividend’ is the environmental dividend reaped. Triple 
dividend can simply be thought of as: environment dividend plus efficiency dividend 
(GDP) plus poverty dividend. The welfare change is split up into changes due to envi-
ronment, profits and employment. Table 2 below illustrates that all the simulations do 
yield the first dividend, whether the revenue collected is recycled through a direct or in-
direct tax break. The first dividend here is a net decrease in the amount of water con-
sumed per unit of real government revenue. An additional charge on water consumption 
always leads to a decrease in water demand. All that is needed for the environmental 
dividend to occur is that the increase in water consumption that results from a direct or 
indirect tax break is less than the decrease due to the water charge. The model results as 
shown in Table 2 indicate that this is expected to be the case. 
The water charge increases the price of water and directly affects the amount of water 
consumed. The model predicts that the water charge will lead to a decline in water con-
sumption in the forestry and irrigated agriculture sectors by 32 per cent and 6 per cent 
respectively. Water consumption by the mining sector will decrease by only 3 per cent. 
The decrease in water consumption as a result of the water charge is greater than the in-
crease in water consumption because of tax breaks, thereby yielding the environmental 
dividend. However, a tax break affects all commodities, not only water. Consumers will 
use the extra income to demand more of all commodities, including water. However, wa-
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ter is a necessity, and the demand for it will increase very little, as the results in table 
show. 
Table 2 Effects of various charges on percentage change in water consumption (per 
unit of government revenue). 
 Recycling of   reve-
nue 
Direct tax 
break 
Indirect tax 
break 
Water charge Change in water use 0.0007 0.0009 
Charge on Forestry 0.316 a a 
Charge on Mining 0.026 a a 
  Gold 0.028 a a 
  Coal 0.026 a a 
  Other 0.025 a a 
Charge on irrigated agriculture 0.055 a a 
  Field crops 0.066 a a 
  Horticulture 0.033 a a 
Source: model results. 
Economic effects 
The second dividend is the effect on the total economy, and is determined using the con-
cept of marginal excess burden. The marginal excess burden (MEB) was defined above 
as ‘the loss of overall production efficiency due to taxation’ and is defined here in model 
terms as: 
 MEB = change in real GDP divided by the change in real government revenue 
The MEB’s for all eight water charge policy measures, as well as the two recycling 
measures, are given (and compared) in Table 3. A double dividend is indicated by a ain 
the table. This occurs when the increase in real GDP per unit of real government revenue 
lost as a result of a tax break (recycling policy) is larger than the decrease in real GDP 
per unit of real government revenue collected from a new water charge. 
A charge on water consumed by the mining industry is expected to lead to a decrease in 
real GDP by 54.8 cents per Rand of real government revenue collected from the tax, 
while recycling via either a direct or indirect tax break led to a GDP increase by 59.1 and 
72.5 cents per Rand of real government revenue forsaken by the Government respec-
tively. This suggests that a net gain to the economy can be expected. However, if only 
gold mining is charged, it will not render a double dividend, and neither if only applied 
to coal mining, if the direct tax break is the method of recycling. Other mining industries 
offer quite a different result in that GDP only decreases by 25 cents per Rand with the 
extra water charge. An additional charge on water consumption by irrigated agriculture 
renders double dividends, whether the tax is levied on field crops only, or horticultural 
crops only, or on both. The damage done in terms of MEB is smaller with field crops 
than horticulture. However, additional water consumed by forestry does not yield a dou-
ble dividend. 
The percentage change in total employment per unit of real government revenue col-
lected was also calculated, and the ticks and crosses follow exactly the same pattern as in 
Table 3 above. That is, employment and GDP per unit of real government revenue are 
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closely related to each other. The explanation is simply that the total production function 
in the model has Leontief and CES characteristics, in terms of intermediate and primary 
inputs, so that GDP and employment will always move in the same direction as a result 
of an exogenous shock.  
Table 3 Effects of various taxes on change in real GDP (per unit of government 
revenue (MEB)). 
 Recycling of   reve-
nue 
Direct tax break Indirect tax 
break 
Water use charge MEB/Employment 0.591 0.725 
Charge on Forestry 0.828 r r 
Charge on Mining 0.548 a a 
  Gold 0.965 r r 
  Coal 0.659 r a 
  Other mining 0.249 a a 
Charge irrigated agriculture 0.374 a a 
  Field crops 0.340 a a 
  Horticulture 0.444 a a 
Poverty effects 
The criterion used to measure an improvement in poverty levels is the percentage change 
in total real consumption of the three poorest household groups in the economy, by race. 
The model has eleven household groups and four race groups and it calculated consump-
tion for each group by commodity, as well as total consumption. The results of total con-
sumption for the poorest household group is given in Table 4. This table is, in fact, rep-
resentative of all the three poorest groups as the results for all these groups are similar. 
It is clear from Table 4 that some policy combinations deliver a net improvement for one 
race group while having a detrimental effect on another. The only water charge that 
could be recycled in a way that would benefit all four race groups within the poorest 
groups of households, is a tax on water consumption by mining industries other than 
gold and coal. The table shows why the initial three scenarios proposed by policy-
makers (scenarios 1, 2 and 3 in the Table, as discussed in Section 4.2) are not sufficient 
to solve the water problem in South Africa: each one of them would harm at least one of 
the poorest household categories. Therefore scenarios 2a, 2b, 2c, 3a and 3b were added. 
For example, if all mining industries’ water consumption is taxed, poor Africans would 
be worse off. The model reveals that a better policy would be to only tax water consump-
tion by "other" mining industries excluding coal and gold.  
With regard to irrigated agriculture, it makes sense to differentiate between water 
charges for field crops and for horticultural crops separately. The model shows that a tax 
on irrigated horticultural crops has a more severe influence on the consumption of the 
poorest groups, in that at least one group is made worse off through this tax .On the other 
hand, with irrigated field crops, at most one group is made worse off.  
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Table 4 Effects of various taxes on percentage change in real consumption per unit 
of government revenue – poorest group (H01). 
% change in real household con-
sumption per R1b change in real 
government income 
Recycling of   revenue Direct tax 
break 
Indirect tax 
break 
Water charge Cons/R 
Poorest households 
0.122 a 
0.115 c 
0.142 i 
0.128 w 
0.150 a 
0.139 c 
0.168 i 
0.152 w 
1. Charge on forestry 0.403 a 
0.243 c 
0.111 i 
0.268 w 
r 
r 
a 
r 
r 
r 
a 
r 
2. Charge on mining 0.234 a 
0.036 c 
0.025 i 
0.092 w 
r 
a 
a 
a 
r 
a 
a 
a 
2a. Gold 0.439a 
0.025c 
0.021i 
0.074w 
r 
a 
a 
a 
r 
a 
a 
a 
2b. Coal 0.211a 
0.041c 
0.076i 
0.198w 
r 
a 
a 
r 
r 
a 
a 
r 
2c. Other mining 0.079a 
0.037c 
0.015i 
0.056w 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
3. Charge on irrigated agriculture 0.111 a 
0.146 c 
0.032 i 
0.051 w 
a 
r 
a 
a 
a 
r 
a 
a 
3a. Field crops 0.122a 
0.162c 
0.071i 
0.073w 
0 
r 
a 
a 
a 
r 
a 
a 
3b. Horticulture 0.148a 
0.210c 
0.032i 
0.059w 
r 
r 
a 
a 
0 
r 
a 
a 
Note: Race groups: a – African; c – Coloureds; i – Indians and w – Whites . 
5. Discussion of results 
Extra water charges on forestry are detrimental to three of the four race groups in the 
poorest household group, including Africans who comprise close to 90 per cent of this 
group. The eight key commodities that Africans spend most of their income on are – in 
order of importance - food, petroleum, real estate, textiles, electricity, transport services, 
and other manufacturing and agricultural goods.  
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The direct impact of extra water charges on forestry is, firstly, an increase in the cost of 
the forestry industry and hence its prices, and secondly on wood, paper and pulp, which 
is part of other manufacturing. The agricultural sector is the largest intermediate supplier 
to the food industry, and food is the most important commodity for all households – rich 
and poor. ‘Other manufacturing’ is also high on poor consumers’ priority list, and these 
two channels turn out to be significant in having a detrimental effect on the poor.  
Extra water charges for mining do not have a direct effect on households in the same 
way that water charges for forestry and irrigated agriculture do. Households do buy some 
coal, but no gold or other mining goods, so that there are no direct effects on households 
from the latter two industries. They influence consumers through the downstream effects 
on industries who buy the outputs of the mining industries.  
The effect from the mining industry as a whole comes mostly from more expensive coal, 
through two obvious channels. African households consume coal directly, and they con-
sume electricity, of which coal is the most important intermediate input. The gold mining 
industry has indirect effects only: it sells gold to ‘other manufacturing’, which is a key 
commodity for households. Three of its most important suppliers of intermediate goods 
are petroleum, electricity and ‘other manufacturing’ – all three key commodities for the 
poor. 
The results that appear in Table 4 also take the recycling of revenues into consideration, 
and the effects described above should be compared to the increases in consumption of 
various commodities due to recycling. In general, the recycling benefits all industries, 
while the environmental taxes harm a few industries severely, and affect others margin-
ally. The recycling of revenues allows consumers to have more of all commodities, and 
hence also more of the key commodities which they consume the most. The default net 
outcome of the combined policy options – water charges and recycling – should there-
fore be beneficial to the consumers, unless the environmental effects are focused on a 
few key commodities, and outweigh the recycling effects. The extra water charges on 
‘other mining’ are a case in point. There are few negative effects on consumers since 
they do not buy ‘other mining’ commodities. The most important indirect effects are on 
petroleum, basic iron and steel, and construction, of which only the first is important for 
consumers. Hence the results demonstrate positive net effects on consumption by the 
poor. 
Extra water charges on irrigated agriculture directly increase the cost of field and horti-
cultural production. Field and horticultural products comprise a large proportion of agri-
cultural commodities, and an increase in their prices directly affects the prices of indus-
tries buying them as intermediate inputs. The greatest demand for agricultural goods 
comes from food, ‘other manufacturing’, petroleum and textiles, all important to poor 
households. However, recycling via either a direct or indirect tax break outweighs the 
negative effects of the tax on irrigated agriculture.  
Two features of the effect of the water charge on irrigated agriculture (recycled) are dif-
ficult to explain: (i) the only group that is not made better off is the Coloureds, and (ii) a 
water charge on horticulture seems to have more negative effects than a water charge on 
field crops. Coloureds consume roughly the same key commodities as Africans, but the 
order of importance of commodities differs. For Coloureds, real estate and electricity 
have higher priority in their consumption preferences. Both of these have high interme-
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diate inputs of petroleum in their production processes, and petroleum is affected nega-
tively by an increase in agricultural prices.  
The good news is that with a water charge policy that involves irrigated field crops, Af-
ricans are made better off, whichever way of recycling used. They comprise more than 
89 per cent of total consumption in their six most important commodities, and a very 
high proportion of all commodities consumed by the poorest groups. The Coloured 
population group consumes less than 10 per cent of all commodities in the poorest group 
and is the only group to be harmed by a tax on irrigated field crops.  
It is interesting to compare the above results with those for the richest group of house-
holds, presented in Table 5. A charge on water consumed by ‘other mining’ industries 
still improves real consumption levels, as with the poorest groups. Moreover, a general 
tax on all irrigated agriculture also benefits this richest group, whether the revenue is re-
cycled through a direct or indirect tax break. However, if a water charge is applied to 
field and horticultural crops separately, it becomes apparent that the benefits accruing to 
the rich group would come from the field crops. If a water charge is only applied to hor-
ticulture, two race groups within the rich group will become worse off. 
All the simulation results are summarised in Table 6. The first tick in each cell shows the 
first dividend: the environmental effects are positive in all cases. The second tick or 
cross shows whether a double dividend has been achieved with the combination of poli-
cies, while the third tick or cross shows a triple dividend. Notice that the last crosses 
vary in size: the larger the cross, the more race groups within the poorest household 
group are harmed by the specific policy option. For example, a small cross in the third 
column implies that the policy option is fairly good, but not perfect. There are a number 
of policy combinations that render double dividends, but we are interested in poverty re-
duction with environmental management, and this triple dividend is only obtained when 
a tax on ‘other mining’ is combined with either one of the recycling methods. However, 
recycling the revenues of extra water charges on irrigated field crops benefits more than 
90 per cent of all poor households, and should also be taken into consideration as a vi-
able policy option. 
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Table 5 Effects of various taxes on percentage change in real consumption per unit 
of government revenue – richest group (H12). 
0 5 6 % change in real household con-
sumption per R1b change in real 
government income 
Recycling of reve-
nue 
Direct tax 
break 
Indirect tax break 
0 Water charge Cons/R 
H12 
0.134 a 
0.142 c 
0.163 i 
0.126 w 
0.175 a 
0.183 c 
0.204 i 
0.158 w 
1 Charge on forestry 0.403 a 
0.243 c 
0.111 i 
0.268 w 
r 
r 
a 
r 
r 
r 
a 
r 
2 Charge on mining 0.234 a 
0.036 c 
0.025 i 
0.092 w 
r 
a 
a 
a 
r 
a 
a 
a 
2a Gold 0.467a 
0.027c 
0.026i 
0.134w 
r 
a 
a 
r 
r 
a 
a 
a 
2b Coal 0.192a 
0.038c 
0.077i 
0.157w 
r 
a 
a 
r 
r 
a 
a 
a 
2c Other 0.078a 
0.041c 
0.019i 
0.055w 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
3 Charge on irrigated agri-
culture 
0.111 a 
0.146 c 
0.032 i 
0.051 w 
a 
r 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
3a Field 0.081a 
0.123c 
0.035i 
0.034w 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
3b Horticulture 0.175a 
0.193c 
0.025i 
0.086w 
r 
r 
a 
a 
r 
r 
a 
a 
Note: Race groups: a – African; c – Coloureds; i – Indians and w – Whites.  
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Table 6 Summary of results: Water; MEB (employment); Consumption. 
Water charge Direct tax break Indirect tax break 
Charge on Forestry arr arr 
Charge on Mining aar aar 
 Gold mining  arr arr 
 Coal mining arr aar 
 Other mining aaa aaa 
Charge irrigated agriculture aar aar 
 Field crops aar aar 
 Horticultural crops aar aar 
6. Conclusions 
The simulation results presented in this paper are satisfactory. The largest water user is 
irrigated agriculture, and crucially, a tax on water used by this sector would render the 
desired ‘triple dividends’ for all four-race groups. It also renders double dividends for all 
race groups except poor Coloured people who would be made worse off by this policy. 
However, this group constitutes a small portion of all consumption – less than 10 per 
cent.  
A triple dividend was derived by introducing a water charge on water consumption in the 
mining sector (other than gold and coal). In conclusion, it seems that an additional water 
charge on irrigated field crops in conjunction with a water charge on some aspects of the 
mining sector stand the highest chance of yielding dividends in terms of less water used, 
least impacts on poverty reduction amongst the poor and least impacts on the economy. 
A more detailed analysis with more specific charges needs to be carried out to further 
substantiate this preliminary conclusion. 
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